Amid The Tempest Over Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus A Force Of Calm
WASHINGTON (AP) – A Congressional hearing that lawmakers called the most important of the year opened like a rock concert Monday, with crackling anticipation and screeching feedback from the acoustic speakers.
Yet this show turned out to be David Petraeus, unplugged. Calm, measured, unflinching, the Iraq war commander walked lawmakers through the latest turns in the unpopular war, stopping well short of promising victory but asking the nation to give escalation a chance. Even Democrats who despise the war policy were deferential in the face of the general’s even-keeled demeanor and his shiny silver stars, four to a shoulder.
“He’s one of the best,” said Democratic Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri, who ran proceedings in the ornate hearing room and ordered a succession of protesters ejected when they shouted their anger at the war. In his Army green, under sparkling chandeliers, Petraeus presented statistics on conditions in Iraq that leaped off the page like fever charts on a hospital bed, indicating the patient was terribly ill but might be coming around.
He declared “it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time.” At the moment of highest anticipation – when Petraeus was finally asked to speak, after lengthy opening statements from lawmakers – his microphone failed. In the awkward minutes that followed, two more protesters made a commotion and were removed from the room. The hearing had to recess because of the technical glitch. “Test, test,” someone said through the mike. The acoustic speakers cried foul.
After 10 minutes, all was fixed and the show went on. A protester who called Iraqis “beautiful people” and accused Petraeus of lying was quickly removed during his remarks. Other discordant voices were similarly silenced before he began. Before the general spoke, the anti-war activist Cindy Sheehan was among those arrested for shouting in the room. Democrats were careful to exempt the general from their contempt of President Bush’s course. “This is not a knock on you,” California Democrat Rep. Tom Lantos told Petraeus and Ryan Crocker, ambassador to Iraq. But he said they had come to Congress to “restore credibility to a discredited policy.”
“With all respect to you,” he went on, “I don’t buy it.” As soon as Petraeus finished, three more protesters shouted from the back and were ejected. One of them, a woman wearing a cardboard crown saying “Pull Out,” screamed “No, no, no!” as security guards took her arms and tugged her out of the room. Yet another followed as Crocker began his remarks. An exasperated Skelton said protesters who disrupted proceedings would be prosecuted. “There will be no disturbances,” he vowed, after half a dozen had already taken place.
There was tension, too, among the lawmakers. Republicans objected to an ad taken out by MoveOn.org that accused Petraeus of “cooking the books for the White House,” and they demanded that Democrats disassociate themselves from the sentiment. “Nobody has to distance themselves from something they weren’t associated with,” snapped Rep. Neil Abercrombie, D-Hawaii.
“Take it easy,” muttered Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, R-Fla. Generals command keen attention on Capitol Hill – even William Westmoreland, speaking to a joint session of Congress at the height of the tempest over Vietnam, was interrupted 19 times for applause in a half-hour speech in 1967. President Lyndon Johnson attributed much of the anti-war sentiment to partisan objections to him and felt there was a positive story to be told about Vietnam. Westmoreland stepped forward with his “light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel talks” to members of Congress and the press, said John Mueller, a political scientist at Ohio State.
But as it turned out, he added, “the tunnel was very long.”
(Copyright 2007 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)
“–Iraqi Security Forces– As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of the burden of providing security for their country. Despite concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of qualified commissioned and noncommissioned officers, Iraqi units are engaged around the country. As [the] chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army, National Police and Special Operations Forces Battalions in the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support.
Beyond that, all of Iraq’s battalions have been heavily involved in combat operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with minimal coalition assistance. As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the size of their security forces.
Currently, there are some 445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq’s Interior and Defense ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister Maliki, the number of Iraq’s security forces will grow further by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000. Given the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision, and we will work with the two security ministries as they continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity, leader development programs, logistical structures and elements, and various other institutional capabilities to support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more on its security forces than it will receive in security assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming one of the United States’ larger foreign military sales customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed before the end of this year. And I appreciate the attention that some members of Congress have recently given to speeding up the FMS process for Iraq.
To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving, and Iraqis elements are slowly taking on more of the responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable challenges lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable security. As a result, the United States will be in a position to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
–Recommendations– Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is captured in its title: “Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.” This approach seeks to build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months. It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible, but without rushing to failure.
It includes substantial support for the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces. It also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the need to contest the enemy’s growing use of that important medium to spread extremism.
The recommendations I provided were informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: –
Military aspects of the surge have achieved progress and generated momentum. Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and have slowly been shouldering more of the security burden in Iraq. A mission focus on either population security or transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our objectives. Success against al-Qaida-Iraq and Iranian-supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as well as special operations forces. The security and local political situations will enable us to draw down the surge forces.
My recommendations also took into account a number of strategic considerations:
Political progress will take place only if sufficient security exists. Long-term US ground force viability will benefit from force reductions as the surge runs its course. Regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are critical to success; and Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they recently announced, they do desire continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new UN Security Council Resolution and, following that, they want to negotiate a long term security agreement with the United States and other nations.
Based on these considerations, and having worked the battlefield geometry with Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno to ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the surge forces from Iraq.
In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit’s departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first seven months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past six months underscore that point.
When I testified in January, for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past six months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in one-time al-Qaida strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight against al-Qaida. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib.
Beyond that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq, something about which we and Iraq’s leaders all now have greater concern. In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider factors similar to those on which I based the current recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation.
I will then, as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained here today, also take into consideration the demands on our nation’s ground forces, although I believe that that consideration should once again inform, not drive, the recommendations I make. This chart captures the recommendations I have described, showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our units adjusting their missions and transitioning responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi capabilities permit.
It also reflects the no-later-than date for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and provides a possible approach we have considered for the future force structure and mission set in Iraq. One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes population security, counterterrorism, and transition, to one that is strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, be premature.
We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognized this danger when they wrote, and I quote, “We assess that changing the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations to prevent AQI from establishing a safe haven would erode security gains achieved thus far.”
In describing the recommendations I have made, I should note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq’s problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating consequences. That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq.
Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; Summarizing it in an unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including:
Ahigh risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces Rapid deterioration of local security initiatives Al-Qaida-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver Amarked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows Alliances of convenience by-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver Amarked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows Alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals and Exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.
Lt. Gen. Odierno and I share this assessment and believe that the best way to secure our national interests and avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi elements.
–Closing Comments– Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen with whom I’m honored to serve are the best equipped and, very likely, the most professional force in our nation’s history.
Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer to stay in uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year, in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved well over 130 percent of the reenlistment goals in the initial term and careerist categories and nearly 115 percent in the mid-career category. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure that these great troopers have had what they’ve needed to accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and individual equipment; in munitions; in command, control, and communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED systems and programs; and in manned and unmanned aircraft have proven invaluable in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most recently especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection against improvised explosive devices are also of enormous importance.
Additionally, your funding of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in Iraq. In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier again in Iraq with America’s new “Greatest Generation.”
Our country’s men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters serving in Iraq today. Thank you very much. END
By CALVIN WOODWARD Associated Press Writer
(Copyright 2007 by The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.)
