ABC-7 takes a look at security checks for airport employees

Those flying this holiday season will have to go through a TSA security checkpoint.

But, what is being done to make sure someone is keeping tabs on the ones keeping tabs on us?

Following last years breach in security, after a baggage handler in Atlanta was smuggling weapons on a commercial airline, Homeland Security evaluated airport access control.

They made 28 recommendations which can be found below. TSA immediatly implemented five of them.

Evan Folan reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. DHS should immediately shift existing resources, as needed, to expand the
TSA’s random employee screening/inspection program (i.e., the Playbook to
secured area access points.

2. TSA, in coordination and collaboration with government and industry subject
matter experts and airport and aircraft operators, should develop an employee
access security model using intelligence, scientific algorithms, and risk-based
factors. This model should give all employees the expectation that they are
subject to security screening/inspection at any time while working at an airport.

3. TSA should establish risk-informed, enhanced random screening/inspection for
all employees, which would be increased on the basis of identified risk.

4. DHS should request from Congress needed funding for implementation of
security measures for a to-be-developed employee access security model and
the Playbook.

5. Airport and aircraft operators should prominently post signage at access portals
or via other means to alert employees that they will be subject to
screening/inspection in order to support compliance with random
screening/inspection programs.

6. TSA should accelerate the implementation of the FBI/Next Generation
Identification (NGI) Rap Back Service with an immediate pilot with airport and
aircraft operators with a goal of full implementation by the end of CY 2015. Realtime
recurrency should be part of the CHRC vetting process, similar to the
perpetual vetting conducted by TSA for the STA.

7. TSA should review the existing list of disqualifying criminal offenses to ensure
that it is comprehensive enough to address the current threat environment and
pursue any legislative or regulatory changes needed to update the list of
disqualifying criminal offenses, other eligibility criteria, the addition of permanent
disqualifying criminal offenses, extending the look-back period, and starting the
period of adjudication on the individual’s sentence release date or program
completion date.

8. Airport and aircraft operators should introduce new certification language for
badge applications that broadens the focus from existing regulatory requirements
to a greater focus on overall suitability.

9. Airport and aircraft operators, in coordination with TSA, should review current
training for Trusted Agents and Signatory Authorities and, as needed, provide
enhanced training on identification documents, identity fraud, and behavioral
analysis.

10. TSA should create and maintain a national database of employees who have had
their airport- and/or aircraft operator-issued badges revoked for cause.

11. A comprehensive review should be conducted by the TSA to enable a web-based
portal for industry utilization for employee vetting by TSA.

12.TSA’s Security Threat Assessment should be enhanced to include SSN, running
all U.S. citizens against SAVE, fingerprints against DHS’ IDENT system, TSA Pre
?® Disqualifying Protocols, and run foreign nationals and foreign-born
employees against international databases.